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THE SEWELL DOCTRINE: A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
The National Labor Relations Act guarantees to employees the
right to form labor unions through representatives of their own choos-
ing.' Provision is also made for the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to call elections whenever a legitimate question of represen-
tation exists.2 The prelude to these elections is customarily character-
ized by both employer and union campaigns calculated to apprise
employees of the respective advantages and disadvantages of unioni-
zation. In the course of these campaigns, employees are usually sub-
jected to numerous claims and counterclaims. To insure that employ-
ees are not unduly influenced by the more objectionable propaganda
techniques, the NLRB is empowered to regulate employer and union
speech.:
Inherent in Board regulation affecting employer and union ex-
pression is the danger that such regulation will violate first amend-
ment rights of free speech.' The problem is to discern whether the
particular expression is constitutionally protected, and if so, to deter-
mine whether it is being impaired. Particularly susceptible of abuse
is the NLRB's practice of nullifying elections favorable to employers
or unions who direct campaign appeals toward the racial prejudices
of employees.-,
In the early days of its existence, the NLRB rigidly enforced a
standard of "strict neutrality" against employers during the period
preceding representation elections.' Anti-union statements attributa-
ble to employers were deemed coercive per se and in violation of
section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with employees in the
exercise of their rights to organize.7 One of the remedies for this
1. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities .
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
3. See Sewell Mfg. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962); General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
4. It is well settled that participants in labor controversies are entitled to first
amendment protections. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); NLRB v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); NLRB v. Yokell, 387 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1967).
5. See Sewell Mfg. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
6. See Citizen-News Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1118 (1940); Hamilton-Brown Shoe
Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1140 (1938); Nebel Knitting Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 284, 293 (1938);
Knoxville Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 559, 561-64 (1938).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). "(A) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
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violation was the setting aside of elections favorable to employers.'
With slight modification this policy continued9 until Congress en-
acted section 8(c) of the Act in 1947, which states that
the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemi-
nation thereof. . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."'
The adoption of section 8(c) was motivated by the Congressional
desire to guarantee freedom of expression to employers, employees
and unions."
In 1948 the Board, in General Shoe Corp., 2 set down the rule that
"an atmosphere which renders improbable free choice will sometimes
warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not
constitute an unfair labor practice."' 3 Although under section 8(c)
non-coercive speech could not constitute a section 8(a)(1) violation,
such speech occurring in the course of a pre-election campaign would
permit the NLRB to set aside an election which did not reflect the
impartial judgments of employees.
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
8. See C.S. Harriman & Sons, 64 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1945); Electrical Util. Co., 57
N.L.R.B. 399 (1944); Chapman Dehydrator Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 344 (1943).
9. See Note, 38 VA. L. Rav. 1037, 1040 (1952): "The Board and the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged the Virginia Electric & Power Co. case to the extent that they no longer
based their decisions upon isolated speeches. In the very same cases, however, they
reiterated the doctrine that employers must maintain strict neutrality during organiza-
tional periods." See also American Oil Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1942); Sunbeam Elec.
Mfg. Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 469 (1942), modified, 133 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1943).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
11. See Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations
Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 242 (1963); Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organi-
zation Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1960). It has never
been definitely established that the protection afforded by section 8(c) is co-extensive
with the guarantees of the first amendment, though several appellate decisions have
assumed that it and the first amendment provide the same safeguards. See NLRB v.
Gisell, 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950);
NLRB v. LaSalle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949); NLRB v. Kropp Forge
Co., 178 F.2d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 1949); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786
(1962).
12. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). See also Bausch & Lamb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873
(2d Cir. 1971).
13. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
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The Sewell Doctrine
The Board position concerning non-coercive inflammatory ap-
peals to racial prejudice was clearly expressed in Sewell Manufactur-
ing Co.," wherein an election was invalidated due to the employer's
appeal to the racial prejudices of his white employees. Two weeks
before the election, the employer mailed to employees a picture of a
white man dancing with a black woman, with a caption suggesting
that the white man was connected with the union which was attempt-
ing to organize in the plant. Employees were exposed to photographs,
letters, newspapers and other publications which tended to establish
an alliance between the union and civil rights organizations, and
linked the union to racial integration, socialistic legislation and com-
munism. In addition, employers were told that past contributions to
civil rights organizations had been paid out of union dues.
In Sewell, the Board did not purport to condemn all racial ap-
peals. It recognized that the communication of truthful statements
pertaining to a union's position on racial issues is relevant and must
be permitted."' However, the purveyor of racial messages must meet
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that they were truth-
ful and germane;' a party must not "deliberately seek to overstress
and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant and inflammatory ap-
peals."' 7 It should be reiterated that in Sewell the employer's expres-
sion was not coercive and therefore not an unfair labor practice.
Rather, the NLRB concluded that the extreme appeals to racial prej-
udice "create conditions which make impossible a sober, informed
exercise of the franchise."'" The Board, in setting aside the election,
was merely fulfilling its function "to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted under conditions as nearly perfect
as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees."' 9
Employer racial propaganda has been held to constitute grounds
for both a section 8(a)(1) violation (i.e., an unfair labor practice) and
for setting aside an election under the principles of Sewell.26 In
14. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
15. Id. at 71: "We would be less than realistic if we did not recognize that such
statements, even when moderate and truthful, do in fact cater to racial prejudice. Yet
we believe that they must be tolerated because they are true and because they pertain
to a subject concerning which employees are entitled to have knowledge-the union's
position on racial matters."
16. Id. at 72.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 71.
19. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
20. See Boyce Mfg. Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 756 (1963). Employer representatives in-
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Durant Sportswear and Amalgamated Clothing Workers,21 involving
only an unfair labor practice charge, Sewell was cited for the proposi-
tion that an employer has the right to inform his employees of the
organizing union's racial policies, so long as the statements are truth-
ful and made without undue appeal to racial prejudice." It seems
that the NLRB incorrectly applied Sewell, which concerned a situa-
tion not involving an unfair labor practice. Truth is not an issue in
the determination of what is an unfair labor practice. Perfectly truth-
ful statements may constitute threats under section 8(a)(1),23 while
non-coercive misrepresentations may not.2"
Subsequent to Sewell, there have been few cases in which elec-
tions were set aside due to employer or union racial propaganda not
constituting an unfair labor practice. However, in Universal Manu-
facturing Corp. of Mississippi," the Board set aside an election as a
result of the employer's activities which rendered impossible "the
rational, uncoerced selection of a bargaining representative." 6 The
Board strictly adhered to the standards of Sewell, holding that a
handbill and cartoon sponsored by the employer went beyond the
bounds of permissible campaigning. Included in the propaganda was
formed black employees that the union discriminated against blacks. Another em-
ployee was told that management would not prevent the replacement of black workers
with whites, which the employer predicted would occur if the union won the election.
The employer was held to have violated section 8(a)1 by threatening that in the event
of union victory, the company would yield to the predicted demands that the black
work force be replaced. See also Ladish Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 982 (1970); Bush Hog, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1966).
21. 147 N.L.R.B. 906 (1964).
22. Id. at 917.
23. Under section 8(c) expression shall not "constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). Thus a statement which amounts to a prescribed
threat may give grounds for an unfair labor practice charge notwithstanding its
truthfulness.
24. Unless made in connection with or in furtherance of a threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit, misrepresentations do not form the basis for an unfair labor
practice. However, they may constitute grounds for rescinding an election where the
deviation from the truth is so substantial as to significantly affect the outcome of the
election and the misrepresentation is made at a time when the opposing party has no
adequate opportunity to reply. See Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224
(1962).
25. 156 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1966). For a recent case in which the Board overturned
an election partly on the ground that the employer had interfered with an election by
telling employees that union shops did not have Spanish-speaking foremen, see Media
Mailers, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 50 (1971). The Board held that section 8(c)'s protections
did not apply because only the validity of a representation election was at issue.
26. Universal Mfg. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1467 (1966).
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reference to a gift allegedly made by Teamsters president James
Hoffa to Dr. Martin Luther King. While noting that Hoffa may have
made the gift, the Board held that such fact was irrelevant to the
union's campaign; failing to educate or inform the employees about
germane issues, the disclosure did not meet the standards of Sewell.
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v.
Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc.,27 expressly approved the Sewell doc-
trine in denying enforcement of an NLRB order directing an employer
to bargain with a newly organized union, thus invalidating the elec-
tion which the Board had upheld. Over a five-week period union
leaflets informed the predominately black work force that they had
been "held down" and told them to "LET US HELP YOU TO GET
UP.""5 Other leaflets adverted to racial disturbances that had re-
cently taken place at nearby Cambridge, Maryland. The court stated
[ejquality of race in privilege or economic opportunity was not
presently an issue. That a majority of the employees were Ne-
groes did not make it so. For the union to call upon racial pride
or prejudice in the contest could have no purpose except to in-
flame the racial feelings of voters in the election.
2
1
As in Universal Manufacturing, the court's decision rested upon a
finding that the union activity was highly inflammatory and utterly
irrelevant in violation of the Sewell standards.
Typical of the cases in which employer resort to racially-oriented
statements did not invalidate elections is Allen-Morrison Sign Co.,:"
decided the same day as Sewell. In that case, the employees received
letters from their employer suggesting that they would be faced with
a choice between segregation and integration in the upcoming elec-
tion. The letter stated that the national union actively promoted a
policy of integration and alleged that the union used membership
dues to further integration. The Board held that the letter was tem-
perate in tone and advised the employees as to material matters.
Although the Board made no mention of the employer's burden of
truthfulness, it must be assumed that he sustained it.
Union injection of racial propaganda into an election campagin
may also result in the setting aside of an election. However, in the
27. 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966).
28. Id. at 679.
29. Id.
30. 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962). See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 911
(1969) (Sending reprint of article entitled "What Unions Do to Blacks," to black
employees, held to be permissible campaigning).
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majority of cases, the NLRB and courts have rejected employer alle-
gations that such elections were tainted with infirmity. In Archer
Laundry Co., 31 the employer charged that union appeals to prejudices
of black employees created "an atmosphere . . .which prevented a
free and fair expression of employee free choice. '32 Leaflets distrib-
uted among employees stated that a "yes vote for the union is a yes
vote for freedom" and pictured blacks being abused by policemen
and police dogs. Anti-management statements attributed to a civil
rights leader were also contained in the leaflets. Employees were
urged to be "a free person not a handkerchief-head Uncle Tom." The
Board recognized that both the Archer and Sewell factual situations
were characterized by strong racial appeals but perceived a vital
difference in the themes of the two campaigns. The two cases were
distinguished on the ground that the literature used in Archer was
calculated to engender racial consciousness on the part of the employ-
ees, while in Sewell the appeal was directed at the racial animosities
of the employees. The Board interpreted the leaflets as conveying to
employees the belief that a vote for the union was a vote for better
working conditions. Stress was placed upon the fact that the litera-
ture in Archer was relevant to the employee's intelligent exercise of
the franchise, which it said was not the case in Sewell. It seems that
the Board differentiation of the two cases on the basis of relevancy is
somewhat questionable. Working conditions, which included inter-
mingling with blacks on an equal basis, were also of great concern to
Sewell's employees.33
Constitutional Status of Sewell
In NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.,3" the United States
Supreme Court initially considered possible first amendment limita-
tions upon the scope of Board regulation of employer speech. The
NLRB had determined that by posting a bulletin which emphasized
the amicable relationship enjoyed by the company with its employees
since previous rejection of unionization, the employer had violated
31. 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965). See Aristocrat Linen, 150 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1965);
Baltimore Luggage v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1968). The court affirmed a Board
decision that racially-oriented letters and speeches addressed to the economic and
social self-interest of black employees provided no basis for invalidating the election.
It approved Sewell but noted that blacks made up an identifiable economic bloc with
special problems.
32. Archer Laundry Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965).
33. As the Board has held, employees are entitled to know the union position on
racial matters. See note 15 supra.
34. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
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section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Court cautioned that this activity
alone could not, within constitutional bounds, be made the founda-
tion of a section 8(a)(1) violation. In Thomas v. Collins," the Su-
preme Court, in striking down a state statute requiring that union
organizers register before soliciting memberships, held that the Con-
stitution guarantees freedom of speech to both employers and em-
ployees. Thus, the amendment's operation is not to be restricted by
the fact that the controversy occurs in a labor setting.
Although the Sewell doctrine was established in 1962, the Su-
preme Court has not decided its constitutionality. However, in Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers of America," the Court acknowledged
that section 8(c) "manifests a congressional intent to encourage free
debate on issues dividing labor and management."37 Quoting N. Y.
Times v. Sullivan," the Court stated
cases involving speech are to be considered against the back-
ground of a profound commitment to the principle that debate
• . .should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks.31
The Court unequivocally endorsed, in a labor setting, the principle
that "the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls
short of a deliberate or reckless untruth .... "I' Though the Linn
case involved neither racially-oriented statements nor the validity of
a representation election, its broad language casts doubt upon the
constitutional soundness of the Sewell doctrine which requires rele-
vancy and temperateness in addition to the truthfulness of the ex-
pression.
Also relevant to the constitutional status of the Sewell doctrine
is NLRB v. Corning Glass Works," a First Circuit Court of Appeals
case where the court said that "the First Amendment . . .protects
. . .an employer with respect to the oral expression of his views on
labor matters provided his expressions fall short of restraint or coer-
cion."42 Since non-coercive expression is constitutionally protected, it
35. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). See also NLRB v. Yokell, 387 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
37. Id. at 62.
38. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 63.
41. 204 F.2d 422 (lst Cir. 1953).
42. Id. at 427.
[Vol. 34
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should provide no basis for setting aside a representation election. 3
The Sewell standard was intended to insulate employees from
irrelevant, inflammatory statements and half-truths which tend to
divert them from the "real" issues surrounding representation elec-
tions. It has been suggested, however, that the proper antidote for
such statements is "more speech, not enforced silence."44 Similarly
the Supreme Court, in Wood v. Georgia,45 concluded that errors in
judgment and unsubstantiated opinion should be met with counter-
argument and education rather than abridgment of the rights of free
expression.
Such language hardly seems compatible with the Sewell require-
ment that racially-oriented statements be temperate. The difficulty
in ascertaining the crucial distinction between inflammatory expres-
sion and that which is temperate is evidenced by the contrary results
reached in Archer and Schapiro & Whitehouse. The rhetoric involved
in the former case seemed far more inflammatory than the racial
campaign in the latter case. Yet in Schapiro & Whitehouse the elec-
tion was nullified while in Archer the union victory was affirmed. The
Sewell standard seems "susceptible of the sweeping and improper
application" of which the Court warned in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button.46
In that case, the Court emphasized that government may regulate in
the area of the first amendment only with narrow specificity in order
to give first amendment freedoms breathing space to survive."
Particularly suspect is the Board's policy of placing the burden
of justifying his speech upon the purveyor of racial statements. The
Supreme Court, referring to freedom of speech, has said that protec-
tions don't "turn on the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs . . . offered"; there is no exception for any test of truth
and "especially not one that puts the burden of proving truth on the
speaker."4 Under the Sewell standard, speech, though entitled to
first amendment protection, may nevertheless be stifled where for
any reason the speaker cannot meet his considerable burden.49 The
constitutional difficulty of Sewell is compounded by the rule that any
43. Pertinent is the court's admonition that, "It is not for the Board or this Court
to alter or curtail an employer's constitutional or statutory rights." Id. at 428.
44. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis). See also Comment, 17 STAN. L. REV. 373, 404 (1965).
45. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
46. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See Comment, 17 STAN. L. REV. 373, 404 (1965).
47. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
48. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
49. See Comment, 17 STAN. L. REV. 373, 404-05 (1965) and the discussion of
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) therein.
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doubts as to the propriety of the statements will be decided against
the speaker. Since in the Linn case, the Supreme Court made the
defamation standards of New York Times applicable to cases involv-
ing defamation in labor disputes, it seems reasonable that these con-
stitutional standards should be applied to all first amendment con-
troversies concerning labor disputes.
Any conclusion that the Sewell doctrine is unconstitutional must
be premised upon the assumption that the setting aside of a represen-
tation election constitutes sufficient restraint of expression to invoke
the safeguards of the first amendment. The Supreme Court has in a
variety of contexts held that certain governmental action amounted
to an impermissible impairment of expression. In Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press, '5 a tax imposed upon certain publications was held to have
unduly burdened free speech rights of the press. In another instance,
a defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct stemming from his
participation in a demonstration was set aside because the jury's
verdict may have been founded upon his communication of constitu-
tionally protected ideas .51 The potential for curtailment of unfettered
political discussion inherent in threats of, or actual imposition of
pecuniary liability for alleged defamation was recognized in
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. BreslerY2 Certainly
the amendment protects citizens against varied forms of governmen-
tal infringement. 53 The fact that the NLRB did not label Sewell's
expression as violative of the Act should not take the action of invali-
dating the election outside the operation of the first amendment. 4
The practice of nullifying elections favorable to the "offending" em-
ployers or union not only deprives them of victory, but forces them
to incur the effort and expense of a second election, thereby restrain-
ing their free speech.
Permissible Regulation
The Board could probably take sanctions against employers or
50. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
51. Bacheller v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
52. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
53. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960): "Freedoms such as
these Ireferring to first amendment freedoms] are protected against heavy-handed
frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental influence." See
also Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
NLRA, 38 HARV. L. REV. 38, 67-74 (1964), where Professor Bok notes that by subjecting
the employer to another election the Board is clearly attempting to restrain this type
of speech.
54. Invalidating an election is, however, also a remedy for a section 8(a)l viola-
tion. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
[Vol. 34
19731 COMMENTS
unions who make false statements with reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity. 5'  Clearly it could likewise act against those who use
statements or expressions involving threats excluded from constitu-
tional protection.5 The NLRB could perhaps limit the use of speech
which tends only to inflict personal abuse upon a person or group of
persons." In Beauharnais v. Illinois,5" the Supreme Court approved a
group libel statute which curtailed "malicious defamation of racial
and religious groups. . . calculated to have a powerful and emotional
impact on those to whom it was presented."5 However, the Court, in
Terminiello v. Chicago," noted that even provocative speech which
induces unrest and "stirs people to anger" serves a vital function
under our system of government.'
A possible constitutional basis for the Sewell doctrine might be
found through a superficial reading of NLRB v. Gissel,"2 decided in
1969. The Supreme Court made statements which would suggest that
an employer's first amendment rights may be limited to the extent
that they conflict with his employee's right to organize." The Court
said
any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of
course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting.
55. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53 (1966),
where the court indicated strongly that employer or union misrepresentations which
do not meet the standards set down in New York Times v. Sullivan, 383 U.S. 53 (1964),
are entitled to no constitutional protection.
56. See NLRB v. Gissel Pack. Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969).
57. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942): "There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-these
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940), the court stated:
"Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument." See also CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941).
58. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
59. Id. at 261.
60. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
61. Id. at 4.
62. 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969).
63. The Supreme Court has recognized that employees have a constitutional right
to organize. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). See also
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945): "The right to discuss and inform people
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected
not only as a part of speech but as a part of free assembly."
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Thus, an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of
the employees to associate, as those rights are embodied in sec-
tion 7 and protected by 8(a)l and the proviso to 8(c).11
When considered in its context, it seems that those statements have
reference only to the Court's conception of the difference between a
prediction and a threat-a difference material only to a finding of an
unfair labor practice.", Furthermore, first amendment rights-
including, of course, the right to organize "-are not protected against
private infringement and thus not against employer or union interfer-
ence.
Conclusion
The Sewell doctrine provides that one who makes use of racial
messages is charged with the burden of proving that they are truthful
and germane, with any doubts resolved against the speaker. Irrele-
vant, inflammatory racial appeals are not permitted, regardless of
their truthfulness. Precariously co-existing with the Sewell doctrine
is the principle that all participants in labor controversies are entitled
to the same first amendment protections as other citizens. In non-
labor settings the courts have constructed elaborate safeguards for
the protection of unpopular, poorly reasoned and even untrue expres-
sion. Although the Supreme Court has declared that the first amend-
ment does not sanction coercive expression, under the Sewell stan-
dard, non-coercive speech may be curtailed. In view of these consider-
ations, it seems implausible to assert that citizens involved in labor
controversies have the same first amendment rights as others as long
as the Sewell doctrine remains operative.
Kenneth R. Williams
64. 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
65. Thus, in balancing the co-equal rights of employers and employees, the Board
must "take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employ-
ers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more
disinterested ear." Id. at 617.
66. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). But see Farm Workers
v. Mel Finerman Co., 84 L.R.R.M. 2081 (D. Colo. 1973). There it was held that a union
was entitled to access to a migrant labor camp for the purpose of attempting to
persuade workers to unionize. The union, however, had to exercise their first amend-
ment rights subject to certain restrictions in deference to the camp owner's right to
exercise dominion over his property. The court deemed that there had to be a fair
adjustment between the competing constitutional rights of the owner and the union
and implicitly recognized that first amendment rights are protected against absolute
exercise of the owner's property rights.
[Vol. 34
